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time leaving the autonomy of the will intact. Instead, part II of the book in 
a way operates as a continuation of part I by giving a detailed and careful 
description of the problem-together with an intention to bar easy solu-
tions. Thus, Frierson goes on arguing against the possible misunderstand-
ing (at times to be found in the Kant literature) that an empirical assistance 
to the development and stabilization of the moral will, although certainly 
"needed" in a general way, could be taken as a strictly "necessary" pre-
condition for the very possibility of a good will: "The need for empirical 
aids to combat radical evil does not mark an exception to Kant's principle 
of 'ought implies can'" (135). 
Does Frierson succeed with his project to integrate Kant's anthropol-
ogy into his moral philosophy? The answer is yes and no. At the conclu-
sion of the book Frierson claims to have shown that "Kant can reconcile 
his strong conception of freedom with a robust moral anthropology" (p. 
166). Such reconciliation, however, is not tantamount to a full integration. 
As Frierson himself repeatedly emphasizes, empirical anthropology and 
the concept of freedom cannot be reduced to one another, and the way in 
which they relate to each other finally remains opaque. This is not a bad 
result since it enhances the awareness of the limits of any empirical in-
quiry, an insight which, as Frierson persuasively argues, remains relevant 
as "a Kantian legacy for today" (165). 
Symbolic Representation in Kant's Practical Philosophy, by Heiner Bielefeldt. 
Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. 202. $60.00 (cloth). 
PATRICK R. FRIERSON, Whitman College 
Symbolic Representation in Kant's Practical Philosophy is a sweeping book, 
covering a wide variety of important topics in Kant's practical philosophy, 
ranging from Kant's categorical imperative to his accounts of history and 
religion. The book has eight chapters. In the first, Bielefeldt introduces the 
overall purpose of the book in two ways. First, he explains that "the gen-
eral purpose of this book is to show that Kant's practical philosophy can 
help us to develop an appropriate language of liberal ethics in the broad-
est sense" (3). Second, the book's "purpose ... is to reconstruct the role 
that symbolic representation plays in the entire architecture of Kant's prac-
tical philosophy" (10). Although Bielefeldt has some provocative hints in 
his introduction and conclusion regarding the first point, the second is 
really the focus of the book. With the exception of occasional references to 
the political dangers of dogmatic or overly skeptical approaches to ethics 
(e.g., "bigotry" on p. 32 or "ideological witch hunts" on p. 103), liberalism 
does not appear in the core of the book. And Bielefeldt makes no system-
atic effort to show how the specific way in which Kant uses symbolic rep-
resentation is well suited to liberal ethics.! Still, this frame sets a context 
of political and ethical relevance for what might otherwise be a book of 
interest primarily for Kant's scholars. 
The second task, of reconstructing the role of symbolic representa-
tion in the whole of Kant's philosophy, provides Bielefeldt with a rubric 
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within which he stakes out his position on an extremely wide variety of 
issues within Kant's practical philosophy. In chapter 2, "Kant's Socratic 
Enlightenment," Bielefeldt lays out the overall contours of his approach 
to Kant's practical philosophy. He compares Kant to Socrates in several 
respects, but the most important is that Kant, like Socrates, seeks to op-
pose "sophistry," which Bielefeldt connects with both skepticism and 
self-deception -" a temptation to push aside ... the claims of morality 
by imposing sophistic objections" (24). Bielefeldt rightly suggests that 
Kant seeks a way to combat this skeptical sophistry without falling back 
into what he calls a "blind defense of virtue" (28), one that would simply 
insist upon the rights of virtue without reflection. Kant's "Socratic En-
lightenment," Bielefeldt claims, "takes up the skeptical questions raised 
by the sophists, but puts them into the broader framework of a system-
atic scrutiny of morality, a scrutiny that itself presupposes a systemat-
ic critique of all faculties of human reason" (28). This Kantian-Socratic 
systematic scrutiny of morality leads, Bielefeldt claims, to the Kantian 
recognition that morality is something "unconditioned" and therefore 
"incomprehensible" (31), and this, for Bielefeldt, leads to the question, 
"How can we respect the non-graspability of the unconditioned and, at 
the same time, connect it with our daily moral practice?" (32). Bielefeldt's 
claim, naturally, is that "Kant's answer ... relies on the deliberate use of 
symbolic representation" (33). The rest of the chapter explains how Biele-
feldt uses the term "symbolic representation" throughout the book. He 
offers a very broad definition of this notion, identifying it with any form 
of "indirect discourse" which "points to something that itself remains out 
of the reach of direct understanding" (35) as well as with any reasoning 
of an "as-if" variety in Kant. 
Chapters 3-7 take up different themes in Kant's practical philosophy, 
showing how indirect discourse and/or as-if forms of reasoning enter into 
Kant's views. These chapters can be divided in terms of general themes as 
well as the primary Kantian texts to which they most apply. Thus Chapter 
Three focuses on the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason. It dis-
cusses the status of the "fact of reason" (Kant's assertion that "the moral 
law constitutes ... a reality that we experience as a kind of facticity" [41]), 
the nature of "respect for the moral law," and two of Kant's formulations 
of the categorical imperative. Chapter 4, which focuses on the Ground-
work and the Doctrine of Virtue, draws on recent work on maxims to show 
how the moral law applies in concrete moral practice. Chapter 5 offers a 
"symbolic" reading of Kant's political writings, especially the Doctrine of 
Right. Chapter 6 examines Kant's Critique of Judgment and historical es-
says. Like the Critique of Judgment, this chapter covers a range of issues, 
from Kant's treatment of the beautiful and sublime to his notions of moral 
progress in history. Chapter 7 will likely be the most interesting chapter 
for many readers of Faith and Philosophy. Here Bielefeldt turns to Kant's 
philosophy of religion, and he covers the full range of Kant's treatment of 
religion, from Kant's familiar rejection of "theoretical attempts to prove 
God's existence"(154) to the variety of "symbolic" treatments of religion, 
including religion'S basis in moral autonomy and the way in which God 
is thought of as an author of nature.2 Bielefeldt also goes considerably fur-
ther than most scholars in taking seriously the details of Kant's "Critique 
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of the Christian Church" (170), including Kantian treatments of "the Bible, 
religious dogmas, and religious worship" (171). 
Throughout, Bielefeldt seeks to connect his specific treatments of these 
themes with symbolic representation. Thus his discussion of the first 
formulation of the categorical imperative-"act only in accordance with 
that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a 
universal law" (Kant's Groundwork 4:421, Bielefeldt p. 47)-focuses on the 
way in which "the unconditionality of the moral command manifests it-
self symbolically in that strict universal lawfulness that also characterizes 
the law of nature" (47-48). This symbolic reading helps Bielefeldt make 
sense of why Kant would recast this formulation of the categorical im-
perative in terms of the laws of nature, and it helps him connect the moral 
law more explicitly to Kant's reflections on nature and beauty. Again in his 
reading of Kant's political philosophy, Bielefeldt sees "the order of rights 
as a symbol of human dignity (96, my emphasis), and more specifically 
recasts the "general will" as "a critical symbolism in which the united law-
giving will of the people is applied merely in the as-if mode of indirect 
representation" (108).3 
In his conclusion, Bielefeldt brings his diverse discussions together into 
a brief summary of his overall account: 
Rather than presenting a systematic theory or typology of symbols, 
Kant clarifies the general status of symbols as an indirect mode of 
representation. Whereas in many cases we have different options to 
express insights in a direct or an indirect way, the indirect mode of 
representation is indispensible whenever it comes to rendering some-
thing "supersensible" accessible to the human mind .... [T]his gen-
eral function of symbolic representation unfolds in very different 
ways .... Summing up the main results of this book, I ... focus ... 
on four essential purposes that the use of symbols is supposed to 
fulfill in Kant's practical philosophy: (1) giving guidelines for moral 
judgment, (2) expressing the apodictic force of the moral law, (3) 
strengthening a reasonable moral hope, and (4) rendering societal 
institutions [including the Church] transparent to their underlying 
normative functions. (181) 
As should be clear from this summary, Bielefeldt's conclusion is not the 
"systematic account of symbolic representation" (10) that was promised in 
his introduction. Rather, his book ends up giving something more like a ty-
pology of various diverse sorts of indirect discourse, a typology that allows 
Bielefeldt to survey virtually the whole of Kant's practical philosophy. 
The advantage of this typological approach is that Bielefeldt contributes 
his perspective to almost every major debate in contemporary discussions 
of Kant's practical philosophy, and the book can serve as a resource for 
non-experts to get up to speed on some of the little known gems of Kant's 
practical philosophy. For example, Bielefeldt draws attention to the role of 
maxims and moral judgment as a way of responding to Hegel's "charge 
of emptiness" -that Kant's categorical imperative has no moral content. 
Bielefeldt briefly lays out the claim-developed in more detail by Bar-
bara Herman and Onora O'Neill-that maxims and moral judgment help 
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"mediate between the universalizability requirement on the one hand and 
the concrete lifeworld on the other" (68-69). Another important aspect of 
Kant that Bielefeldt highlights is the role that "empirical feelings" such as 
"compassion or empathy" play in morality: "Although [they] can never 
serve as the normative basis of morality ... , they should be cherished as 
support provided by nature to foster our moral obligations" (83). Biele-
feldt does not give much detail about how these feelings function as sup-
port, but he does point out an aspect of Kant's thought that is increasingly 
gaining attention among Kantians (see especially work by Nancy Sher-
man). Both of these "hidden gems" are hidden only to those outside of 
Kantian circles. The importance of moral judgment and empirical feelings 
is widely recognized by those whose reading of Kant extends beyond the 
Groundwork. But Bielefeldt also discusses some important aspects of Kant 
that have not yet been widely noticed even among Kantians. His discus-
sions of Kant's religion still fall into this category, as does his treatment of 
the important role of "politeness as symbolic role playing" in Kant (88). 
But Bielefeldt's broad scope also has an important disadvantage, in that 
it is difficult for the reader to figure out specifically how "symbolic repre-
sentation" is supposed to unify the book. Partly this is a stylistic problem, 
as there are discussions-such as his interesting but apparently tangential 
discussion of "what Kant's political philosophy can contribute to contem-
porary debates on separation of powers" (l14)-that seem interesting but 
have no apparent relevance to symbolic representation. But the problem 
goes beyond merely the presence of tangents that are insufficiently con-
nected to the overall thread of Bielefeldt's argument. It is clear from his 
discussions that Bielefeldt does not limit his use of the term "symbol" 
to Kant's own fairly specific (though admittedly underdeveloped) defi-
nition of the term in the Critique of Judgment (d. 5:352).4 Kant's account 
there makes clear that merely negative judgments, though they may point 
to something out of reach, are not symbolic; pure judgments of practical 
reason are not symbolic since they do not appeal to any "empirical intu-
itions" (5:352); and paradoxes and antinomies are not symbolic since they 
do not point to anything at all but only highlight a problem. Yet Bielefeldt 
makes reference to all three sorts of judgment as forms of indirect dis-
course that his book will investigate but, alas, not sufficiently distinguish 
from one another. 
By subsuming all of his quite different topics under the rubric of sym-
bolic representation or indirect discourse, Bielefeldt often makes it harder, 
rather than easier, to see how they relate to each other. Early in his book, 
for example, Bielefeldt offers this case of "as-if cognition," which in this 
context seems to be identified with symbolic representation: 
In the Groundwork, for instance, Kant compares the "good will" of 
human beings with the "holy will" of an absolute being, as ifhe could 
conduct a comparative analysis between man and God, which, as he 
has pointed out lucidly in his first Critique, is in fact completely im-
possible. It would thus be a grave misunderstanding to read Kant's 
proposition about the divine will as standing beyond all imperatives 
as a theoretical proposition concerning the nahue of God. (36) 
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Bielefeldt is certainly correct that interpreting Kant's claim that the divine 
will stands beyond all imperatives as a theoretical proposition about God's 
nature would be a grave misunderstanding. This is true, first, because any 
claim about whether one stands under imperatives is a practical claim, 
not a theoretical one. But this hardly makes these claims symbolic, even 
if it shows that they are not theoretical. To conflate the "non-theoretical" 
with the "symbolic" makes the task of finding symbolic representation in 
Kant's practical philosophy trivial. Likewise Bielefeldt is correct that the 
first Critique rules out any theoretical proofs of the existence or nature of 
God or human wills, but this does not rule out comparative analyses of the 
two. In the case of human and holy wills, in fact, Kant quite clearly does 
compare these two wills; he does not simply conduct himself" as if" such 
a comparison is possible. He specifies precisely how the wills are differ-
ent, and what practical consequences that has. Of course, his discussion of 
the difference in wills is a practical rather than theoretical discussion, and 
he makes a practical point with it, but this does not make the discussion 
less of a direct comparison. 
In another example, Bielefeldt discusses the connection between moral-
ity and religion as "a relationship of an indirect (symbolic) connectedness of 
different perspectives of meaning" (161). In support of this claim, Biele-
feldt argues (rightly) that for Kant "moral obligation does not depend on 
religion" (159).5 But this hardly shows that the connection between the 
two is indirect, especially since Kant makes quite clear that "morality ... 
leads inevitably to religion" (6:6, Bielefeldt p. 159). Bielefeldt seems to be 
using the notion of an "indirect" or "symbolic" connection to refer to any 
connection other than the one against which he is arguing. That is, unless 
the connection were such that morality depended upon religious belief, 
the connection must be "indirect." But for Kant, there is a quite direct con-
nection between the two, in that morality justifies belief in God and im-
mortality. And the fact that this justification is practical rather than theo-
retical does not in itself imply anything "indirect" or "symbolic" about the 
connection between morality and religion, nor about the claims of either. 
These are just two (of many) examples that show how Bielefeldt's treat-
ment of Kant's practical philosophy does not isolate a specific strand of 
"symbolic representation" in anything but a deeply equivocal set of sens-
es of that term. Although he defines "symbolic representation" in terms of 
indirect discourse early in the book, the best overview of what Bielefeldt 
actually means by this term comes in his taxonomy in the conclusion to 
the book. Readers are advised to read this conclusion-perhaps even be-
fore reading the rest of the book-as an overview of the central concept 
of the book. 
Despite this criticism, there are three aspects of the book that will be 
of particular interest for readers of Faith and Philosophy. First, Bielefeldt 
connects symbolic representation to the more theologically loaded issue 
of human fallibility and finitude (e.g., 63, 82, 85, 129, 140, 165). Bielefeldt's 
concluding sentences provide some hint of how this focus on human fini-
tude leads to a healthy reading of Kant as proponent of modesty in prac-
tical life: "As finite beings, we are ... unable directly to understand how 
such an interconnectedness [of human experience and self-understand-
ing] may come about. The critical reflection on moral autonomy, at any 
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rate, can give rise to a comprehensive philosophical orientation, which by 
confining itself to the modest language of symbolic representation, may be well 
suited for preserving the conundrum of the human being's moral voca-
tion" (187-88). 
Second, Bielefeldt is one of very few serious Kant scholars to take Kant's 
religious writings seriously. And Bielefeldt does not investigate only the 
classic Kantian contributions to the philosophy of religion narrowly con-
strued, Kant's arguments against traditional metaphysical argument for 
the existence of God and his moral "proof" of God's existence. Instead, 
Bielefeldt joins a small but growing contingent of Kantians-including 
Kantians as diverse as Allen Wood, John Hare, Philip Quinn, and myself-
who see philosophically important arguments in the details of Kant's Reli-
gion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, and who read this text as particu-
larly important for a clear understanding of Kant's practical philosophy 
as a whole. I would especially encourage readers of Faith and Philosophy 
to scan Bielefeldt's seventh chapter to get a sense of the range of issues in 
philosophy of religion about which Kant has something important to say. 
Finally, and of particular interest for Christian philosophers, Bielefeldt 
offers a relatively significant treatment of grace in the context of his over-
all discussion of Kant's views on religion. Bielefeldt misses some impor-
tant aspects of Kant's account of grace, such as the role that grace plays in 
dealing with radical evil (as described, for example, by Philip Quinn in the 
pages of this journal and by myself in Freedom and Anthropology in Kant's 
Moral Philosophy). And Bielefeldt reads grace in what I see as an overly 
symbolic way, saying that "grace is none other than the nature of the hu-
man being insofar as he is determined to actions by a principle which is 
intrinsic to his own being" (178). Still, the very fact that Bielefeldt draws 
attention to this central Christian doctrine as a central Kantian doctrine is 
worth attention. 
NOTES 
1. Bielefeldt's general contention in his opening discussion of liberalism 
is that liberals need a way to engage in "a discussion of 'values,' 'virtue,' and 
'faith'" without dogmatism (3). Bielefeldt here picks up on critiques of con-
temporary liberalism by thinkers such as Charles Larmore (not referenced in 
Bielefeldt, but d. Charles Larmore, 'The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism" 
in The Journal of Philosophy, December 1999, 96: 599-625). Bielefeldt, like Lar-
more, argues that liberalism has a moral basis that is often not articulated for 
fear of dogmatic moralizing. Unlike Larmore, though, Bielefeldt suggests that 
Kant's use of symbolic representation can provide the language that liberalism 
needs to avoid the twin shoals of blind dogmatism and empty skepticism. 
2. Bielefeldt does not survey Kant's criticisms of traditional metaphysics 
here. (Such surveys are common elsewhere, however. See, for example, Allen 
Wood's Kant's Philosophical Theology, which has a detailed treatment of these 
criticisms.) Instead, he seeks to show how these theoretical arguments for the 
existence of God "far from lending strength to religious belief, actually lead 
into an abyss of skepticism and unbelief" (154). Thus his focus is on the sym-
bolic-which here means anti-dogmatic - role of these arguments, rather than 
their details. 
3. Bielefeldt somewhat overstates the contrast between this approach and 
what he calls "Rousseau's totalitarian ideology of political salvation" (108), 
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but his general point is to emphasize the symbolic nature-by which he here 
means "as-if" mode-of Kant's political theory. 
4. Bielefeldt references (6-7) Kant's key treatments of the concept of sym-
bol, but he only very briefly discusses (37) the treatment in the Critique of Judg-
ment. 
5. Bielefeldt goes a bit further than Kant himself, though, when he argues 
that "An atheist is, no less than a religiously committed person, able to listen to 
the voice of his or her conscience as well as to actually perform its command-
ments" (159). Although it would take me too far afield here, Kant's discussion 
of Spinoza in the Critique of Judgment strongly suggests that without religious 
belief, one will be considerably less likely to obey the moral law. 
